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THE TAXATION OF CRIME VICTIM
RESTITUTION: AN UNJUST PENALTY ON THE
VICTIM
I. INTRODUCTION

There is no question that a tort plaintiff may recover damages
for personal physical injuries tax-free;' but what are the tax
consequences for the crime victim who recovers victim restitution?
The recoveries of both the tort plaintiff and the crime victim are
compensation for personal physical injuries, but differ slightly in that
the tort plaintiff receives damages in a civil action, whereas the crime2
victim receives victim restitution in a criminal proceeding.
Nonetheless, this subtle difference between an award in civil court
versus one in criminal court may be the underlying basis for taxing
one but not the other.
Section 104(a)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code (the "Code") is
the governing statutory law on the taxation of recoveries received.
This section provides an exclusion from gross income for personal
physical injury recoveries. 3 More precisely stated, the provision
provides a gross income exclusion for "the amount of any
damages.., received.., on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness."4 In general, it is well settled under section
104(a)(2) that civil damages recovered by the tort plaintiff may be
excluded from income. The law on the taxation of crime victim
restitution, however, is less established. 5
Reconciling victim restitution awards with section 104(a)(2)
hinges on the meaning given to the term "damages" as provided in
the statute. Victim restitution may be subject to section 104(a)(2)
treatment if damages under the statute are construed broadly to
1. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000); infra Part II.B.2.

2. See infra Part I.B.3.
3. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
4. Id. (emphasis added).
5. See infra Part II.B.3.
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include not only damages per se, but all forms of recoveries that are
compensatory in nature. 6 If however, damages under the statute are
construed narrowly to include only recoveries in the name of
damages, then victim restitution falls outside the scope of section
104(a)(2). In effect, under this narrow reading and absent any other
applicable gross income exclusion in the Code, it appears that a
recovery of victim restitution would be taxable income.
This narrow construction of section 104(a)(2) may have been
justified during a period when damages and restitution were based on
separate and distinct recovery theories. That is, the concept of
damages is rooted in compensation but restitution was originally
based upon unjust enrichment. Following the integration of crime
victim restitution laws into the federal sentencing structure in 1982, 7
damages and restitution no longer stand as autonomous principles.
Victim restitution, in contrast to simple restitution, adopts a
compensatory purpose similar to damages-recovery is measured by
the victim's loss, not by the criminal's gain.8 Compensation, in
essence, no longer exists solely in damages received in a civil
judgment; instead, it has journeyed into criminal proceedings in the
form of victim restitution.
This Comment addresses the taxation of victim restitution
awards in criminal proceedings in the context of section 104(a)(2)
and takes the broader view that damages under the statute encompass
not only damages per se, but also any other recoveries that are
compensatory in nature. Because victim restitution functions as
compensation, it should be included in the same gross income
exclusion afforded to damages under section 104(a)(2) and thus be
nontaxable. In Part II, this Comment reviews the Internal Revenue
Service's (IRS) tax treatment of recovery awards. Receipts of
6. This is assuming that victim restitution serves a compensatory purpose
and satisfies the statute's other requisite element that it be received "on
account of personal physical injuries or physical sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
7. See Victim and Witness Protection Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-291, 96
Stat. 1248 (1982) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 3663 (2000)). Congress
incorporated restitution into the criminal system in the 1982 Victim and
Witness Protection Act ("VWPA"). See Irene J. Chase, Comment, Making the
Criminal Pay in Cash: The Ex Post Facto Implications of the Mandatory
Victims RestitutionAct of 1996, 68 U. CI. L. REv. 463, 463 (2001).
8. See DOUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AMERICAN REMEDIES 816 (2d ed.
1994).
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various recoveries, such as punitive damages, compensatory
damages, and restitution, will be analyzed under general tax
principles governing gross income and under the exclusionary
provisions of the Code. Part HI then focuses on restitution awards
and traces their development from civil beginnings into the criminal
framework. Recognizing that victim restitution is a hybrid remedy in
both criminal and civil law, Part IV proposes that victim restitution,
like compensatory damages, should be excludible under section
104(a)(2) due to its compensatory nature. Finally, this Comment
provides recommended revisions, consistent with this theory, to the
language of certain legislative and administrative materials.
II. BACKGROUND: THE TAXABILITY OF RECOVERIES RECEIVED

A. GrossIncome
The IRS imposes federal income tax on "taxable income";9 that
is, "gross income"' 0 less deductions authorized by the Code.' This
Section analyzes 'whether recoveries of crime victim restitution for
personal physical injuries fall within the meaning of gross income
under section 61 of the Code. Section 61(a), in particular, provides
that "gross income means all income from whatever source
derived."' 2 Gross income, in other words, is a broad term of art that
includes any and all amounts received that improves the taxpayer's
economic position. 13 With respect to recoveries from litigation
settlements and judgments, unless the Code provides an applicable

9. I.R.C. § 63 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
10. Id. §61.
11. See JAMES J. FREELAND ET AL., FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 47 (9th ed. 1996).
12. I.R.C. § 61(a) (emphasis added).
13. Congress did not so much define gross income by what it is, but rather
by what it is not via exclusionary provisions in the Code. Part II of the Code's
Subchapter B, in particular, details items specifically excluded from gross
income. See I.R.C. subtitle A, ch. 1B, pt. 11 (1994 & Supp. 2000); see also
Jennifer J.S. Brooks, Tax Consequences of Settlements and Judgments, in 1986
A.B.A. NAT'L INST. ON DAMAGES, NEW SETrLEMENT TECHNIQUES AND TAX

CONSEQUENCES 213, 217 (1986) ("[A]nything that betters the taxpayer's
economic position could be thought 'includible' in gross income.").
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exclusion, and unless it represents a mere recovery of capital, the
award is included in the recipient's gross income. 14
Before inquiring whether an amount falls under an exclusionary
provision, it must first be established that the amount is actually
income. If it is not income, then it is simply nontaxable and no
further analysis is required. If it is income, the taxpayer must meet
an exclusionary provision under the Code for the amount to be
excluded from gross income. Absent an applicable exclusion, the
amount will ultimately be included in gross 15income and subject to
income tax imposed by section 1 of the Code.
The first question with respect to taxability is whether an
amount is in fact income. The Supreme Court's landmark case of
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass' provides that any "undeniable
accessions to wealth, clearly realized, and over which the taxpayer[]
[has] complete dominion" is income within the meaning of section
61(a). 17 In other words, income equals those amounts over which the
taxpayer has enjoyed an economic benefit, when such wealth was
realized, 18 and the taxpayer has exercised dominion and control over
this wealth.' 9
Under this general definition of income, a victim who receives a
pecuniary recovery from a settlement or court judgment appears to
meet the criterion set forth in Glenshaw Glass. The victim receives a
net economic benefit by virtue of a monetary recovery, realizes the
wealth by immediately claiming ownership over the recovery, and
has dominion and control over the recovery because of legal
entitlement to the wealth. Ostensibly, receipt of any monetary
awards could be considered income under section 61 (a).
B. An Exclusionfor CertainDamages
Once it is established that an amount received is income, the
question becomes whether such amount falls under a gross income
14. See Patricia T. Morgan, Old Torts, New Torts and Taxes: The Still
UncertainScope ofSection 104(a)(2), 48 LA. L. REV. 875, 882 (1988).
15. See I.R.C. § 1 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
16. 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
17. Id. at 431 (holding that punitive damages for fraud and antitrust
violations were windfalls includible in gross income).
18. See Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920) (establishing the
"realization" requirement).
19. See Glenshaw Glass, 348 U.S. at 431.
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exclusionary provision. Amounts received for injuries or sickness
are generally governed by Code section 104.20 Section 104(a)(2), in
particular, excludes from gross income "any damages...
received.., on account of personal physical injuries or physical
sickness." 21 Note that section 104(a)(2) distinguishes between
damages and other forms of recovery. Thus, the classification of
a
22
recovery as either damages or non-damages determines taxability.
Although it is clear that only damages will be eligible for
favorable tax treatment under the statutory exclusion, a considerable
area of uncertainty lies within the meaning of damages under the
statute. Vagaries in the interpretation of damages have contributed
to an incoherent body of law on the taxation of recoveries. 23 For
instance, damages can be construed to encompass various recoveries,
including punitive damages, compensatory damages or restitution. It
is confusing and unpredictable as to which of these variants fall
under the rubric of damages in section 104(a)(2).
Courts have nonetheless attempted to provide some sense of
order and structure to alleviate ambiguity. To that end, the Supreme
Court announced a two-prong test in Commissionerv. Schleier24 that
became a standard commonly used by the courts in determining
whether a25personal injury recovery may be excluded under section
104(a)(2).
First, the underlying cause of action giving rise to the
recovery must be "based upon tort or tort-type rights." 26 Second,
20. Beyond the scope of this Comment are other Code sections addressing
the inclusion of damages or settled recoveries of other types of recoveries. For
example, these include: I.R.C. section 71, Alimony and separate maintenance
payments; section 80, Restoration of value of certain securities; section 111,
Recovery of tax benefit items; section 1341, Computation of tax where
taxpayer restores substantial amount held under claim of right; and section
1351, Treatment of recoveries of foreign expropriation losses.
21. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000) (emphasis added). This
exclusion, on the whole, applies to compensation for personal injuries awarded
in civil actions in tort. See Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970).
22. Assuming no other exclusionary provisions in the Code apply.
23. See Brooks, supranote 13, at 215.
24. 515 U.S. 323 (1995).

25. See id. at 336-37 (establishing two independent requirements that a
taxpayer must meet before a recovery may be excluded under section
104(a)(2)).
26. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (as amended in 1970); see Schleier, 515 U.S.
at 337. Courts have generally followed state law in determining what
constitutes a tort. See Threlkeld v. Comm'r, 87 T.C. 1294, 1305-06 (1986),
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damages must be received "on account of personal physical injuries
or sickness."27 These independent requirements must be satisfied
before excluding a personal injury recovery under section 104(a)(2).
By meeting the tort or tort-type rights requirement, the test ensures
28
that the recovery received was one with a compensatory function.
The second prong, requiring that the recovery be received on account
of personal injury, represents a causation element
that links the
29
damages recovered to the personal injury itself.
1. Punitive damages
Punitive damages in personal injury cases are sometimes
recovered in addition to compensatory damages, and are generally
awarded to punish the tortfeasor. 30
Until recently, great
of punitive damages. 31
taxation
proper
the
in
existed
inconsistency
Under the test laid down in Schleier, punitive damages seem to fail
to qualify for section 104(a)(2) treatment. Even if the recovery is
received with respect to a personal physical injury claim that satisfies
the second requirement, punitive damages are nonetheless included
in gross income because they are not based on tort-type rights; rather,
they arise from the lawsuit and are intended to punish the defendant
for wrongful conduct.32
The language of section 104(a)(2), moreover, explicitly bars
punitive damages from its applicability. 33 It provides that the
affd, 848 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1988). The IRS, however, takes a contrary position
and ruled that what constitutes a tort is governed by the nature of the injury and
not by state law. See Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56. Any further study
in determining what constitutes a tort according to the Treasury Regulations is
beyond the scope of this Comment.
27. Schleier, 515 U.S. at 333.
28. See T. James Lee, Jr., Note, Section 104(a)(2) After Commissioner v.
Schleier: Litigating the Excludability of Statutory Damages "Received on
Account ofPersonalInjuries", 1996 BYU L. REV. 531, 539 (1996).
29. See id. at 540-41.
30. See Brooks, supra note 13, at 228.
31. Awards of punitive damages are now categorically and explicitly
excluded from the meaning of damages covered by section 104(a)(2). See
I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
32. In a 1984 ruling, the IRS concluded that punitive damages do not
qualify for the exclusion because they are intended to punish the tortfeasor
rather than to restore a capital loss. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34;
Brooks, supra note 13, at 228.
33. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2).
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exclusion applies to "the amount of any damages (other than punitive
damages) received.., on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness. 34 Before the 1996 amendment to the statute,
however, there did not exist such a bright-line exclusion for punitive
damages from the section 104(a)(2) exclusion from gross income.
Until the 1996 amendment added the parenthetical phrase "other
than punitive damages," which once and for all excluded punitive
damages from section 104(a)(2) treatment, there was much confusion
and conflict among the circuits as to whether the statute extended to
punitive damages.
The IRS took the position, which was later
confinned by the 1996 amendment, that all exemplary and punitive
damages are taxable.36 In general, something is "taxed in the same
manner as the items for which the recovery is intended to
substitute." 37 Punitive damages, then, are a taxable substitute for
ordinary income because
they are "windfall" income-they do not
38
compensate for loss.
On the other hand, proponents for the exclusion of punitive
damages relied on the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act3 9 enacted
in 1989, which provided that the gross income exclusion was
available for awards of punitive damages involving physical injury

34. Id. (emphasis added).
35. The 1996 amendment inserted the parenthetical phrase, "other than
punitive damages" following "damages." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2). Before the 1996
amendment, section 104(a)(2) read: "gross income does not include the
amount of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal injuries or
sickness." I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994).
36. See Rev. Rul. 84-108, 1984-2 C.B. 32, 34. The Fourth, Fifth, Ninth,
and Tenth Circuits joined the IRS's position that section 104(a)(2) did not
exclude punitive damages-all punitive damages, irrespective of whether they
were received for physical injury or sickness, are fully taxable. See O'Gilvie
v. United States, 66 F.3d 1550, 1560 (10th Cir. 1995); Estate of Moore, 53
F.3d 712, 716 (5th Cir. 1995); Wesson v. United States, 48 F.3d 894, 902 (5th
Cir, 1995); Hawkins v. United States, 30 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 330, 352 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586, 592 (4th Cir.
1990).
37. Morgan, supra note 14, at 882; see also Raytheon Prod. Corp. v.
Comm'r, 144 F.2d 110, 113 (lst Cir. 1944).
38. See Brooks, supranote 13, at 227.
39. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-239, 103
Stat. 2106.
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or sickness. 40 In other words, any damages, whether compensatory
or punitive, which were received on account of personal physical
injuries were excludible under section 104(a)(2).
In 1996, Congress rejected this overreaching proposition, and
Congress
the IRS's narrower position ultimately prevailed.41
reasoned that:
[pjunitive damages are intended to punish the wrongdoer
and do not compensate the claimant for lost wages or pain
and suffering. Thus, they are a windfall to the taxpayer and
appropriately should be included in taxable income.
Further, including all punitive damages in taxable income
provides a bright-line standard which avoids prospective
litigation on the tax treatment of punitive damages received
a case involving a physical injury or
in connection with
42
sickness.
physical
As a result, punitive damages, even if received in a personal physical
injury case, are viewed as windfall income and clearly fall outside
the scope of the section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
2. Compensatory damages
The taxability of compensation awards, on the other hand,
differs entirely from punitive damages. In personal injury cases,
compensatory damages are typically awarded for actual loss
suffered. This receipt of compensatory damages is the quintessential
type of recovery falling within the breadth of the statutory exclusion
and has been tax exempt since 1918.43 Perhaps most telling of all is
40. See id. § 7641(a), 103 Stat. at 2379; see also United States v. Burke,
504 U.S. 229, 237 (1992) (deciding that the focus must be on the nature of the
claim underlying the damage award in determining taxability); Horton v.
Comm'r, 100 T.C. 93, 94 n.2 (1993), af'd,33 F.3d 625, 630 (6th Cir. 1994);
Miller v. Comm'r, 93 T.C. 330, 339 (1989), rev'd, 914 F.2d 586, 592 (4th Cir.
1990).
41. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-586,
at 142-44.
42. Id. at 143.
43. See Revenue Act of 1918, Pub. L. No. 65-254, § 213(b)(6), 40 Stat.
1057, 1066 (1919); T.D. 2747, 20 Treas. Dec. Int. Rev. 457 (1918).
Compensatory recovery for personal injury is the hallmark of excludability
under section 104(a)(2) because it has been analogized to returns of capital-it
merely restores the taxpayer to the status quo by making the taxpayer whole.
See Brooks, supra note 13, at 220.
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the language of section 104(a)(2), which explicitly provides for the
excludability of personal physical injury damage awards from gross
income. 44 The.exclusionary provision applies to "the amount of any
damages (other than punitive damages) received..,
on account of
45
personal physical injuries or physical sickness."
As a general rule, damage recoveries for injury to the person are
nontaxable by statute because it "adds nothing to the individual .... 46
as before the injury."

It is an attempt to make the plaintiff whole
Another way to understand it is that if the award is a "pecuniary

restoration of a nontaxable 'something' the taxpayer has lost,",4 7 then

it may be excluded from income. In the context of a recovery for
personal physical injuries, the nontaxable something the plaintiff lost
is the value of being uninjured.48 Thus, when the plaintiff recovers
compensatory damages to restore that something the victim lost"being physically whole" 4 -- fro the defendant's wrongful conduct,
it is nontaxable income because it was never taxable to begin with.50
Plaintiffs receipt of the compensatory damages, therefore, is not a
substitute for ordinary income because its purpose is to place the
injured plaintiff in the position the plaintiff would have occupied had
the wrongful
conduct not been committed; that is, the rightful
51
position.
44. Section 104(a)(2), however, does not provide a blanket exclusion for all
kinds of damage awards, but rather is limited to only those amounts received
on account of personal injuries or sickness. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 &
Supp. 2000). Even prior to the 1996 amendment, the title of section 104,
"Compensation for injuries or sickness" already seemed to suggest that it
applied only to compensatory damages. Id. § 104 (emphasis added).
45. Id. § 104(a)(2) (emphasis added).
46. Hawkins v. Comm'r, 6 B.T.A. 1023, 1025 (1927). In contrast to
punitive damages, there is wide acceptance that compensatory damages for
personal injury are excludible under section 104(a)(2). Because compensatory
damages have always been generally excludible, the focus in litigation is not
on whether personal injury damages are taxable, but rather on which personal
injury damages are nontaxable.
47. Brooks, supranote 13, at 221.
48. See id. at 222.
49. Id.
50. Compensatory payments for losses otherwise received tax-free but for
the injury should also be received tax-free. See id. at 216.
51. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1982). If,
however, a damage award replaces something taxable that the taxpayer had
and lost before it was included in gross income, then it is not entitled to an
exclusion and is thus taxable. See Brooks, supranote 13, at 227.
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Beyond that, an award of compensatory damages for personal
physical injury meets the requirements for excludability under the
test established in Schleier.52 First, the underlying cause of action
giving rise to compensatory damages for personal physical injury is
unquestionably based on tort-type rights. The damages originate
from the right to personal integrity and are not based on some other
theory, such as breach of contract or injury to one's business or
property, nor are they punitive damages. 53 Second, it is self-evident
that these damages for personal physical injury are received on
account of personal physical injuries or sickness.
This special tax treatment under section 104(a)(2) is also based
on compassion for the victim. Such benevolent exclusionary
provisions of the Code are based on the compassionate belief that the
taxpayer has suffered enough in personal injury cases 54 and the
public policy against overburdening injured plaintiffs.55
To require the inclusion of compensatory damages in gross
income would seem to defeat the remedial purpose of putting the
plaintiff in the rightful position by fully compensating the victim for
his injury. For example, a victim sustaining $500 worth of injuries
might sue for compensatory damages in the amount of $500. When
the court awards this amount, the victim is returned to the financial
52. See 515 U.S. at 333.
53. To qualify for the exclusion under section 104(a)(2), the recovery must
be paid under a tort theory and must represent compensatory damages. It

cannot be based on some other theory, such as breach of contract, nor can it
represent punitive damages. See MARK J. STEGMAN & PATRICK B. MATHiS,

TAX ASPECTS OF LITIGATION, ILLINOIS CIVIL PRACTICE, VOL. II, § 3.18

(1997).
54. Because physical injuries usually result in extensive financial hardship
and personal trauma, the Code provides a gross income exclusion of payments
received as compensation for the injuries. See FREELAND ET AL., supra note
11, at 188; SANFORD M. GUERIN & PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALS IN FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION 183 (5th ed. 1998).

55. Courts and commentators generally condone the exclusion of personal
injury from gross income, rationalizing "that the taxation of recoveries carved
from pain and suffering is offensive, and the victim is more to be pitied rather
than taxed." Bertram Hamett, Torts and Taxes, 27 N.Y.U. L. REV. 614, 627

(1952). Oftentimes, courts base their decision on emotion rather than logic.

See Edward Yorio, The Taxation of Damages: Tax and Non-Tax Policy
Considerations, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 701, 706 (1976-1977); David D.

Willoughby, Recent Development, The Taxation of Defamation Recoveries:
TowardEstablishingIts Reputation, 37 VAND. L. REV. 621, 622 (1984).
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position he started in. The remedy puts the victim back to where he
would have been had the injury never occurred. Without the
exclusion, however, the victim's compensatory award is included in
gross income and taxed. Thus, the net total recovery falls short of
the victim's rightful position.
Arguably, the exclusion is at odds with tax theory because it
creates inequities between personal injury victims and other
taxpayers.56 While a personal injury victim takes damage awards
tax-free, other taxpayers with equal consumable incomes are subject
to taxation. 57 That is, an amount of disposable income received for
personal injuries is taken tax-free, yet the same amount of disposable
income received as wages is taxed, which results in less disposable
income. 58 Nonetheless, over the years, section 104(a)(2) has
received little criticism because the "exclusion is justified on
humanitarian grounds." 59 The taxpayer receives the damages, not
only in the taxpayer's capacity as a plaintiff, but also in the
taxpayer's capacity as a victim.
3. Restitution
Recovery of restitution, however, is a fairly modem remedy,
separate and distinct from other bases of recovery.6 ° For the
moment, the law on the taxation of restitution remains unsettled due
to the incongruence between legislative and administrative
authorities. The crux of the uncertainty lies in the breadth of
interpretation given to the term damages in the statute. If the
statutory language is construed narrowly to cast all recoveries other
than damages per se as being outside the ambit of its gross income
exclusion, then restitution is a casualty of section 104(a)(2)'s hardand-fast rule that the recovery must be in the name of damages. If,
however, the statutory language is construed broadly to apply not
only to damages per se but to any damages-like recovery that is

56. See Lawrence A. Frolik, The Convergence of LC. § 104(a)(2),
Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Liepelt and Structured Tort Settlements:
Tax Policy "Derailed",51 FORDHAM L. REV. 565, 565-66 (1983).
57. See id. at 570.
58. See id.
59. Id. at 565.
60. See infra Part III.A.
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compensatory, then victim restitution may well qualify for the
section 104(a)(2) exclusion.
On the one hand, legislative materials such as the Code enacted
by Congress, and administrative materials such as the Regulations
prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, carve out and recognize
a gross income exclusion for only personal physical injury damages
under section 104(a)(2). The language of the Code and the
Regulations contain repeated reference to damages as specifically
coming within the statute's purview, but neither makes mention of
restitution. Because these materials only speak to damages and do
not address restitution, it would be ill-advised for a taxpayer to infer
either a narrow or broad interpretation of damages.
Other administrative materials, such as rulings emanating from
the Treasury Department have produced rulings consistent with the
broad view-some payments to crime victims, although not called
damages, are nontaxable. 61 In particular, victim compensation
62
awards, although not labeled damages, have been ruled nontaxable.
In a 1974 Revenue Ruling, the Treasury ruled that "[a]wards made
by the Crime Victims Compensation Board of the State of New York
to victims of crime... are not includible in the gross income of the
recipients. ' 63 The ruling did not refer to or base its decision on
section 104(a)(2) for the income exclusion, but rather relied on the
"general welfare doctrine," which provides that "disbursements from
a general welfare fund in the interest of the general public which are
64
not made for services rendered are not includible in gross income."
Almost a decade later, in a 1983 private letter ruling, the
Treasury again ruled that victim compensation was nontaxable. In
contrast to the 1974 ruling, the 1983 private letter not only referred
to the section 104(a)(2) exclusion but used it as the underlying basis
for concluding that a gross income exclusion applied. In its reply to
a request for a ruling concerning the taxability of awards made under
61. See Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-52-025 (Sept.
26, 1983).
62. Victim compensation and victim restitution are not the same and are not
used interchangeably in this Comment. The rulings on the taxation of victim
compensation are mentioned here only to suggest that section 104(a)(2) was
intended to be read broadly to include not only damages, but any recoveries
that are compensatory.
63. Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18.
64. Id. (citing Rev. Rul. 63-136, 1963-2 C.B. 19).
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the Department of Justice's Crime Victim Compensation Program
(the "Program"), the Treasury ruled that "amounts received by a
the claimant's
claimant under the [Program] are excludible from
65
Code.,
the
of
104(a)(2)
section
under
gross income
However, victim compensation and victim restitution are not the
same recoveries. Awards of victim compensation are administered
through state compensation programs where victims must meet
certain eligibility requirements; namely that the recipient was a
victim of certain
enumerated violent crimes and was not related to
66
the offender.
Victim restitution, on the other hand, is an order by the court in
criminal cases that the offender directly pay remuneration to the
68
victim 67 and is generally not limited to specific crimes or offenses.
The crucial difference is that victim restitution allows victims
otherwise ineligible for victim compensation to obtain compensation
for personal physical injuries in a criminal case.
Even if victim compensation and victim restitution are of like
kind, the letter rulings excluding victim compensation from gross
income cannot be cited as precedent for the excludability of victim
restitution. Letter rulings have only limited precedential value since
they are issued solely in response to the taxpayer who requested it
and may not be used as authority by anyone else.69 Therefore,
although the 1983 ruling is on point to address the taxation of victim
compensation and victim restitution recoveries in the context of
section 104(a)(2), it cannot be relied upon as authority.
Since a taxpayer cannot assert letter rulings excluding victim
compensation from gross income as a basis for excluding victim
restitution, the Code and the Regulations must be viewed as the
primary sources of authority. Unfortunately for the recipient of
victim restitution, the Code and the Regulations provide little
guidance in determining whether those receipts will be taxable. If
the reference to damages in section 104(a)(2) is construed strictly,
then it seems that, absent an applicable gross income exclusionary
65. Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-52-025 (Sept. 26, 1983).
66. See JAMES H. STARK & HOwARD W. GOLDSTEIN, THE RIGHTS OF
CRIME VICTiMS 102, 148 (1985).
67. See id. at 148.

68. See id. at 151-52.
69. See I.R.C. § 6110(k)(3) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
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provision for restitution, victim restitution will ultimately be
included in gross income under section 61. However, if the ambit of
damages is open to interpretation, then on a case-by-case analysis,
taxpayers might reason that their particular recovery is really
damages but by another name.
Assuming arguendo that the Code and the Regulations really
intend for damages in section 104(a)(2) to be construed broadly, it
still does not answer whether victim restitution is characteristically
similar enough to damages to qualify under the statute. The question
remains whether victim restitution is more akin to punitive damages
versus compensatory damages for purposes of the statutory
exclusion. If restitution is characterized as punitive, then arguably it
lies outside the scope of the statute, and thus, would be included in
gross income. However, if it is characterized as compensation, then
it is analogous to compensatory damages, which fall under the
meaning of damages in section 104(a)(2) and thus is excludible from
gross income.
III. DECIPHERING CRIME VICTIM RESTITUTION
To properly assess how crime victim restitution recoveries
should be taxed, a firm understanding of the underlying nature and
purpose of the recovery is helpful. The logical starting point of
analysis is to look at restitution itself. Because restitution is a
sweeping term that is not self-defining, it is better understood as an
entire body of law rather than simply a remedy. In order to make
sense of victim restitution, its evolutionary development must be
traced from its very inception.
A. The EvolutionaryDevelopment ofRestitution
Historically, the Anglo-American legal system maintained "a
strict separation of criminal law from civil law." 70 This division has
been seemingly relaxed, with restitution crossing the boundary
between civil law into criminal law. With its roots in the civil law,

70. Bruce Jacob, The Concept of Restitution: An Historical Overview, in
RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITcAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS

45, 47 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975). By contrast, the German

legal system, for example, sometimes combined a "criminal case and civil
action... for purposes of procedural processing." Id. at 48.
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restitution had always been widely used in tort and contract cases. 7 '
However, with Congress' enactment of crime victim restitution laws,
restitution, once known to exist only in civil cases, became available
in criminal proceedings.
1. Origins in civil law
The restitution suit first emerged in civil law as an alternative
remedy to suing in tort or contract to recover damages. 72 Based upon
the principle of unjust enrichment, "[a] person upon whom a tort has
been committed... [could] elect[] to sue in restitution to recover the
defendant's unjust benefit rather than to sue in tort to recover
damages; he has a choice of alternative remedies." 73 Likewise, a
person could elect to sue under a quasi-contract theory based upon
unjust enrichment to recover money paid to the defendant, on the
ground that it had been paid under a mistake or that it lacked
consideration. 74 Unjust enrichment essentially provided plaintiffs a
restoration of benefits without having to resort to the, fields of
contract or tort law.75
As such, it is not surprising that the substantive law of restitution
is largely devoted to and commonly associated with the equitable
theory of unjust enrichment, as indicated in the very beginning of the
American Law Institute's Restatement (Third) of Restitution and
Unjust Enrichment. Section 1 of the Restatement states that "[a]
person who is unjustly enriched at the expense of another is liable in
restitution to the other., 76 The Restatement illustrates this principle
with the following hypothetical: "A owes B $100 on account. By
mistake, A pays B $200. There is no contract between A and B
establishing a duty to refund a payment not due. B's obligation to
refund the overpayment is a liability in restitution." 77 Restitution
71. See LORD GOFF OF CHIEVELEY & GARETH JONES, THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION 714 (Gareth Jones ed., 1993); S. M. Waddams, Restitution as
Part of Contract Law, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 197 (Andrew
Burrows ed., 1991).
72. See id.
73. Id.
74. See id. at3.
75. See id. at 12.
76. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1

(Discussion Draft 2000).
77. Id. § 1 cmt. d, illus. 6.
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allows a successful plaintiff in a tort or contract case to recover
the
78
expense.
s
plaintiff
the
at
obtained
benefit
defendant's unjust
On the whole, the principle of unjust enrichment "presupposes
three things[:] First, the defendant must have been enriched by the
receipt of a [benefit]. Secondly, that benefit must have been gained
[at the plaintiffs expense]. Thirdly, it would be [unjust] to allow the
defendant to retain that benefit. 79
The first prong concerning the "benefit" conferred upon the
defendant, for purposes of taxation, provides insight into whether
restitution would qualify under the gross income exclusion of section
104(a)(2). In a restitution claim, the benefit referred to is "the
80
[enrichment] [ gained by the defendant at the plaintiffs expense."
In the previous illustration from the Restatement, B gains $100
because of overpayment by A. Because B is enriched by $100, B
benefits by this overpayment and is liable to A in restitution.
Whether the recovery in restitution of a benefit conferred is
taxable depends significantly on how that benefit is measured. When
a plaintiff recovers restitution for unjust enrichment, it is an award
measured by the defendant's gain and not by plaintiffs loss.8 1 For
example, a defendant may be ordered to account for the profits
arising from a breach of contract even if the plaintiff suffered no
loss.8 2 Unlike compensatory damages, restitution as described is not
an attempt to compensate or make the plaintiff whole. Moreover,
restitution awards conceivably may exceed the plaintiffs actual loss
and overcompensate the plaintiff8 3 Restitution would then be84 a
windfall to the plaintiff and should be included in taxable income.

78. See GOFF & JONES, supra note

71, at 3.

79. Id.at 16.
80. Id.
81. See id. at 16-17.
82. See Gareth Jones, The Law of Restitution: The Pastand the Future, in
ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF RESTITUTION 8 (Andrew Burrows ed., 1991).

83. Miscellaneous items of income and windfall income may constitute
gross income under section 61. See Treas. Reg. § 1.61-14 (2001); see also
Cesarini v. United States, 296 F. Supp. 3 (N.D. Ohio 1969), affdper curiam,
428 F.2d 812 (6th Cir. 1970) (requiring that a treasure trove found in a used
piano be included in gross income).
84. See supra Part II.B.1 (discussing the taxability of punitive damages and
windfall income).
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2. Progression into criminal law
Although the emergence of crime victim restitution laws allow
victims to recover directly from the defendant, the separation
between criminal and civil law is still respected. In a criminal case,
the state remains the party initiating the prosecution, not the
individual victim. Before victim restitution laws, the custom of
suing a defendant in a criminal court began with the state assuming
full responsibility for punishment of the criminal and the state
receiving any corresponding payment. 85 The victim was still entitled
to commence a civil suit against the defendant for recovery of
damages. However, it was often futile to try to collect anything from
the assailant, especially after the state had already done so in the
criminal proceeding and exhausted whatever resources the defendant
had to begin with. 6 This inequity between the criminal
and the
87
victim led to legislation compensating victims of violence.
Until Congress passed the Victim and Witness Protection Act
(VWPA) in 1982,8 the victim's only means of obtaining monetary
compensation was to instigate a separate civil suit.89 The VWPA
essentially created crime victim restitution as "a sanction imposed by
officials of the criminal justice system that requires offenders to
make redress in the form of monetary... payments to ... the direct
victims." 90 Victim restitution laws allow prosecutors to seek courtordered restitution to directly compensate victims. The primary
purpose of such a law is to have criminals make restitution to the

85. See JESSE BERNSTEIN, A STUDY OF THE EVOLUTION OF THE CONCEPT
OF RESTITUTION AND RECENTLY ENACTED VICTIM COMPENSATION LAWS IN
NEW YORK AND OTHER JURISDICTIONS 13 (1972) (unpublished Ph.D.

dissertation, New York University) (on file with the Loyola of Los Angeles
Law School library).

86. Empirical studies indicate that only a very small percentage of violent
crime victims who sue their assailants collect a recovery. See id. at 13 n.43.
87. See id. at 13-14.
88. See supra note 7.
89. See Matthew Spohn, Note, A Statutory Chameleon: The Mandatory
Victim Restitution Act's Challenge to the Civil/CriminalDivide, 86 IOWA L.

REv. 1013, 1014 (2001).
90. Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway, Introduction, in RESTITUTION

IN

CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS, supra note 70, at
1.
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victim by restoring or indemnifying victims for all losses suffered. 91
In criminal sentencing, "[d]efendants are often ordered to pay full or
partial compensation to their victims [in the name of] restitution,
although they are always measured by the victim's loss ... and never
by the criminal's gain." 92

As the nineteenth century marked the movement of restitution
into criminal law to compensate victims of crime, it also
compounded the confusion surrounding unjust enrichment and the
law of restitution. 93 Even in its beginning stages before restitution
was introduced into the criminal setting, there was already serious
controversy over the interrelation between unjust enrichment and the
law of restitution. 94 It was unclear whether restitution was the
equivalent of unjust enrichment or something more.95 In other
words, did restitution merely restore to the plaintiff what the
defendant had gained at the plaintiffs expense, or was it an amount
above and beyond such equilibrium?
As restitution made headway into criminal law, the task of
deciphering the confusion surrounding the law of restitution became
even more bleak. The bifurcation of restitution into ordinary
restitution in civil law and victim restitution in criminal law resulted
91. See CHARLES F. ABEL & FRANK H. MARSH, PUNISHMENT AND
RESTITUTION: A RESTITUTIONARY APPROACH TO CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
170 (1984).
92. LAYCOCK, supranote 8, at 816.
93. See Robert D. Childres, Compensationfor CriminallyInflicted Personal
Injury, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM: READINGS IN RESTITUTION AND VICTIM

COMPENSATION 363, 364 (Joe Hudson & Burt Galaway eds., 1975)
[hereinafter CONSIDERING THE VICTIM].

94. Restitution has long suffered linguistic confusion and many legal
scholars today "do not know what restitution is .... The technical competence
of published opinions in straightforward restitution cases has noticeably
declined; judges and lawyers sometimes fail to grasp the rudiments of the
doctrine even when they know where to find it." Andrew Kull, Rationalizing
Restitution, 83 CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1195 (1995).
95. Is restitution-or ought it to be-the law of unjust enrichment, pure
and simple? Is it unjust enrichment and something else besides:
restitution in the sense of restoration or giving back?... Is unjust
enrichment a legitimate unifying principle for this body of law, or is
it at best no more than 'a convenient explanation of specific results'
among 'a truly superlative collection of jurisprudential loose
ends'-employed to unwind, reverse, or pick up the pieces after
anomalous transactions of one kind and another?
Id. at 1193 (emphasis in original).
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in distinct methods by which the recovery was to be measured.
Crime victim restitution-in contrast to ordinary restitution, which
was usually measured by the defendant's gain-was to be measured
instead by the victim's loss.96 In effect, on a sliding scale, crime
victim restitution moved away from restitution and towards
is measured by the victim's loss,
compensatory damages-recovery
97
not by the criminal's gain.
B. Victim Restitution as a HybridRemedy. Criminaland Civil
Because restitution in civil cases differs from restitution in
criminal cases, it follows that they should each be taxed in
The
accordance with their distinctive nature and purposes.
characterization as one kind of remedy or another is the watershed
which determines whether a recovery should be taxed. However,
there is great disagreement over the proper classification of victim
98
restitution as either a civil remedy or a criminal remedy.
According to Holdsworth's treatise on the history of English law: If
a remedy compensates victims, then it is a civil remedy; if it
penalizes offenders, then it is a criminal remedy. 99
To no surprise, victim restitution serves both purposes.
Restitution in the system of criminal justice demands that "whatever
else the sanctioning power of society does to punish its wrongdoers,
it should also insure that the wrongdoer is required to the degree
possible to restore the victim to his or her prior state of well
being."100 Victim restitution is not one or the other; rather it is a

96. See LAYCOCK, supranote 8, at 816.
97. See id.
98. See Bonnie Arnett Von Roeder, The Right to a Jury Trial to Determine
Restitution Under the Victim and Witness ProtectionAct of 1982, 63 TEx. L.
REv. 671, 676-77 (1984).
99. See id. at 676 (quoting WILLIAM HoLDsWoRTH, A HISTORY OF THE
ENGLISH LAW 306 (1922)).

100. Catherine M. Goodwin, "Looking at the Law"--The Imposition of
Restitution in Federal Criminal Cases, 62 FED. PROBATION 95, 95 (1998)
(emphasis added) (citing United States v. Webb, 30 F.3d 687, 689 (6th Cir.
1994)); see also Elizabeth P. Miller, Recent Development, United States v.
Hicks: The Victim Witness ProtectionAct PrecludesRestitutionfor Emotional
Injury in the Absence of PhysicalInjury, 20 J. CONTEMP. L. 195, 196 (1994)
(arguing that victims suffering from emotional, but not physical, injury should
be compensated for their loss).
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hybrid remedy-both criminal and civil. 10 1 Therefore, the dual
purpose
of crime
victim
restitution-punishment
and
compensation-should be the guiding principle in devising a model
for its taxation.
At the outset, the VWPA classified victim restitution as a
penalty and thus a criminal remedy. 10 2 The statutory language of the
VWPA in 1982 allowed judges to order restitution "in addition to...
any other penalty authorized by law."' 1 3 This construction seems to
imply that victim restitution itself is a penalty and that other similar
penalties are covered by the VWPA. In addition, restitution is a
penalty which promotes social reform because "[i]t is constructed to
fit the crime and to emphasize the wrongfulness of the offense and
the defendant's moral responsibility."' 1 4 Ordered in the criminal
justice system, victim restitution "constitutes an element of the
10 5
offender's sentence and therefore must be penal in character."'
Because it penalizes offenders and because "restitution has actually
always been considered a form of punishment,"' 1 6 victim restitution
is a criminal remedy under Holdsworth's test.
In addition to being a criminal remedy, victim restitution is also
a civil remedy because of its compensatory nature. 0 7 Crime victim
restitution can be viewed as civil in character although awarded in
criminal proceedings. 10 8 Arguably, the primary and most significant
purpose of victim restitution, consistent with its civil character, is to
help crime victims. 10 9 Despite victim restitution's punitive character,
Congress was more concerned with compensating victims when it
enacted the VWPA. 110 When a victim is hurt by his offender, the
101. See Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 676.
102. See id. at 680.
103. 18 U.S.C. § 3579(a)(1) (1982) (emphasis added).
104. Note, Victim Restitution in the Criminal Process: A Procedural
Analysis, 97 HARV. L. REV. 931, 939 (1983-1984) [hereinafter Procedural
Analysis].
105. Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 677.
106. ABEL & MARSH, supra note 91, at 23.
107. Victim restitution orders are also characterized as compensatory despite
their inclusion in criminal justice. See Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 680.
108. See CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supra note 93, at xxiii.
109. See Burt Galaway, Toward the Rational Development of Restitution
Programming, in RESTITUTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE: A CRITICAL

ASSESSMENT OF SANCTIONS, supra note 70, at 77, 82.
110. See Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 684.
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injury is remedied through the court by a compensatory judgment for
the injury in the form of victim restitution.' 1 '
Restitution, in effect, is a misnomer for victim compensation in
criminal cases because the purpose of crime victim restitution is "not
based primarily on unjust enrichment, but on compensation for
harm."' 1 2 By definition, victim compensation is the "court-ordered
payment of money.., by a person convicted of a crime as
compensationfor losses suffered by the victin." 1 13 That is, crime
victim restitution is not restitution by its literal reading, but is
essentially the criminal case equivalent to compensatory damages.
The Restatement of Restitution calls attention to and expounds this
misconception about the law of restitution and crime victim
restitution:
Law that establishes (by statute or otherwise) the terms on
which a convicted criminal may be ordered to make
restitution to crime victims is not part of the law of
The
restitution as defined by this Restatement ....
confusion is primarily a linguistic one, illustrating one of
the fundamental objections to using the1 14name "restitution"
to refer to the law of unjust enrichment.
Hence, it appears more fitting to think of crime victim restitution not
as restitution, but as victim compensation.
Crime victim restitution, therefore, is not restitution and does
not carry the same connotations of restitution, unjust enrichment,
Instead, victim restitution is an
quasi-contract, or the like.
independent basis of recovery in criminal cases with a striking
resemblance to compensatory damages in tort cases. 115 Like the
111. See Marvin E. Wolfgang, Victim Compensation in Crimes of Personal
Violence, in CONSIDERING THE VICTIM, supra note 93, at 116, 119.
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. h (Discussion Draft 2000).
113. David L. Roland, Progressin the Victim Reform Movement: No Longer
the "Forgotten Victim", 17 PEPP. L. REv. 35, 41 (1989) (emphasis added).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT § 1
cmt. h (Discussion Draft 2000); see also id. § I cmt. c.
115. It is confusing how restitution, termed a "third category of the common
law, generically different from contract and tort," exists in relation to
Jack Beatson, Should There Be Legislative
compensatory damages.
Development of the Law of Restitution?, in ESSAYS ON THE LAW OF
RESTITUTION, supra note 82, at 279. The Restatement of Torts, however,
seems to suggest that restitution falls under the grouping of compensatory
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personally injured tort plaintiff, victims of crime also have interests
in their persons. 116 Thus, when any of these personal interests are
damaged, victims7 of crime are awarded restitution as compensation
for their losses."1

IV. ELIMINATING THE DISPARITY: A PROPOSED METHOD OF TAXING
VICTIM RESTITUTION IN LIGHT OF ITS DUAL PURPOSE

Unlike damages, no exclusionary Code provision exists
specifically for restitution. 118 The safe harbor of section 104(a)(2)
9
has rarely been acknowledged in the context of restitution awards."
Since its inception, the statute has been read to require recovery in
the form of damages. Therefore, only compensatory damages and
punitive damages have been illuminated in discussions regarding
statutory exclusions for recoveries received. Because restitution
does not have the term damages in its name, its place within section
104(a)(2) is uncertain.

damages by defining compensatory damages as those awarded as
"compensation, indemnity or restitution for harm sustained." RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 (1979) (emphasis added).
116. Victims of crimes have interests in their persons which include:
(1) interests in physical integrity (e.g., immunity from physical
impact: assault and battery, rape, murder, manslaughter), (2) interests
in physical and mental freedom (e.g., immunity from physical and
mental coercion: extortion by physically threatening either the victim
or a third party the victim wishes to protect as in kidnapping, false
imprisonment), (3) interests in their emotional state, good name, and
privacy concerning any "weaknesses" they might have (i.e., immunity
from any anxiety, humiliation, embarrassment or invasion of privacy
not ordinarily expected in the day-to-day commerce of society), and
(4) interests in their general physical and mental health (e.g.,
immunity from reasonably preventable health hazards resulting from
pollution or from being used as an object in experimentation). Any
given crime might include a trespass on any or all of these interests.
ABEL & MARSH, supra note 91, at 160.
117. See id. at 161.
118. Under narrow circumstances in Code section 118, restitution awards
may be excluded from gross income. Because the gross income exclusion of
section 118 applies only to corporations, it does not apply to individual
plaintiffs or victims. Thus, the provision will not be discussed in this
Comment. See I.R.C. § 118 (1994 & Supp. 2000).
119. Perhaps the lack of familiarity with restitution contributes to its neglect
in the Code. See Kull, supra note 94, at 1195-96.
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Recognizing that victim restitution serves the dual purpose of
compensating victims and punishing criminals, 120 this Comment
suggests a review of the current law on the taxation of victim
restitution in gross income. First, although victim restitution is
associated with punishment, it is not the same as punitive damages in
the sense that awards of punitive damages are oftentimes
astronomical and clearly windfall income. 121 Victim restitution, on
the contrary, is measured by the victim's loss and does not
overcompensate.
Victim restitution is considered punishment only
in the sense that it is awarded in a criminal justice system, with the
goals of social reform. 123 In other words, it bears a penal character
only because it is imposed as part of the defendant's criminal
sentence, 124 and not because of how the award is measured.
Irrespective of being branded as punitive, the amount ordered is
dictated by the victim's loss and not by principles governing punitive
damages.
Victim restitution's other function-compensation-should
therefore be the overriding principle governing its taxation. Because
victim restitution serves to compensate for loss to the plaintiff, it is
akin to compensatory damages and thus must be acknowledged
under section 104(a)(2). In light of victim restitution's dual purpose
to compensate and punish, the disparate tax treatment of similarly
situated victims can be resolved by opening the door to a section
104(a)(2) exclusion for the victim based upon its compensatory
nature.
A. Toward Uniformity: Excludible by the Victim Under Section
104(a)(2)
This Comment is primarily focused on the plight of victims and
how victim restitution has been discriminatorily excluded from
section 104(a)(2) analysis. The most straightforward and equitable
approach to correcting the tax disparity between similarly situated
victims is to allow the same section 104(a)(2) exclusion for a
120. See Miller, supranote 100, at 196.
121. See Small Business Job Protection Act of 1996, H.R. REP. No. 104-586,
at 399.
122. See supraPart III.B.
123. See ProceduralAnalysis,supra note 104, at 939.
124. See Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 677.
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recovery, irrespective of the court from which it originates or wha
the recovery is called, so long as it is compensation or compensation
like. The treatment of victim restitution under section 104(a)(2
should be no different than the treatment of compensatory damage
had the action been brought as a tort claim instead of a criminal one
In other words, if the recovery of victim restitution in the form o
compensatory damages from a civil suit is excludible, then it shouli
be excludible in a criminal proceeding as well.
Victim restitution should undergo the same substantive analysi
for determining taxability as applied to compensatory damage
without regard to the linguistic ambiguity arising from it
characterization as restitution. Although the language of sectio:
104(a)(2) explicitly limits the rule to personal physical inju
damage awards, 125 the term damages should not be so narrowl
construed as to exclude other kinds of recoveries that serve the sam
purpose as compensatory damages for physical injury. The scope c
the statute should be broadened to apply to any type of recovery thE
is compensatory in nature; nonetheless, it should be subject to th
existing statutory requirement that the recovery originate fror
personal physical injuries or sicknesses.
126
1. Origination in tort-type rights
Revisiting the test set forth in Schleier, one finds that victir
restitution for personal physical injuries, like compensatory damage
for personal physical injuries, meets the requirements fc
excludability under section 104(a)(2). 127
The second-pron
requirement that the taxpayer recover for personal physical injuric
or sickness is satisfied because at issue is victim restitution fc
personal physical injury. Therefore, the core analysis lies in the fir

125. Section 104(a)(2) does not provide a blanket exclusion for all kinds i
damage awards, but rather is limited to only those amounts received c
account of personal injuries or sickness. See I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Sup
2000).
126. The IRS, in Revenue Ruling 85-97, reaffirmed that all damages arisih
from tort claims for physical personal harm are excludible under section 10
See Rev. Rul. 85-143, 1985-2 C.B. 55, 56 (interpreting Rev. Rul. 85-97); si
also Rev. Rul. 85-97, 1985-2 C.B. 50.
127. See supra Part II.B.2.
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prong of the Schleier test-whether the underlying cause of action
128
giving rise to the recovery is based upon tort or tort-type rights.
What is the underlying cause of action giving rise to a recovery
of victim restitution? One answer is that it is a cause of action for
restitution based on the theory of unjust enrichment, and thus, not
based on tort rights. That assertion, however, is unfounded because
victim restitution is not the same and cannot be mistaken for the law
of restitution and unjust enrichment. 129 As mentioned earlier in this
Comment and affirmed by the Restatement of Restitution,
against a convicted criminal "is not part of
court-ordered restitution
130
the law of restitution."'
On the contrary, victim restitution, although imposed by
criminal sanctions, has its basis in civil liability and tort-type
rights.13 ' As discussed earlier, victim restitution is not only a
criminal sanction but is also a civil remedy. 132 This interplay in
victim restitution has been considered by some commentators to be
an entirely "new paradigm' 133 in the criminal justice system which
seems to "collapse the distinction between crimes and torts"'134 since
both call for damages. 135 When a victim of crime recovers restitution
for injuries to his person, it is compensation originating from the
right to recover losses of tort-based interests in personal integrity. 3 6
Indeed, victim restitution, like compensatory damages for personal
physical injuries, is based upon tort-type rights ultimately meeting
therefore, should qualify for exclusion under
the Schleier test, and
37
section 104(a)(2).1
128. See Comm'r v. Schleier, 515 U.S. 323, 346 (1995) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting); Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (2002).
129. See RESTATEMENT (T'HIRD)

OF RESTITUTION AND UNJUST ENRICHMENT

§ 1 cmt. h (Discussion Draft 2000).
130. Id.; see supraPart III.B.

131. See supra Part III.A.
132. See supraPart HI.B.
133. Randy E. Barnett, Restitution: A New Paradigmof CriminalJustice, 87
ETHICs 279, 279 (1977) [hereinafterA New Paradigm].
134. Randy E. Barnett, Getting Even: Restitution, PreventiveDetention, and
the Tort/Crime Distinction,76 B.U. L. REV. 157, 159 (1996).
135. SeeA New Paradigm,supra note 133, at 299.
136. See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
137. This Comment advocates uniformity and consistency in analyzing
recoveries under section 104(a)(2). Although the Schleier test has been
frequently referred to in analyzing recoveries, it is not the only standard
available. The thesis of this Comment is not to advocate one particular test
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2. A recovery of capital
Excludability is further justified by the capital recovery theory.
Personal injury recoveries have, for a long time, been held to be a
nontaxable return of human capital; that is, one's basis in his
person. 138 Generally speaking, basis recovery is permitted before
taxation begins. Only if and when basis is fully replaced will capital
recoveries result in taxable income. 139 With respect to victim
restitution and compensatory damages, they are equal to a basis
recovery in the plaintiffs injured human capital. Thus, such a
recovery represents an absolute return of capital, which is not taxable
under the basis recovery rules. 140 Under the human capital concept,
"investors in human capital would take an immediate deduction for
141
their costs and would include all of their returns when realized.'
A person who has something (capital), loses it (actual loss or
damage), and then recovers it (judgment or settlement) does not have
an "accession to wealth" under the notion of Glenshaw Glass.142
Simply stated, the taxpayer has not received anything more than
what he had originally-the monetary recovery merely restores the
victim to his status quo.
3. The rule of offset suggests victim restitution is comparable to
compensatory damages
Finally, and perhaps most convincingly, the rule of offset
strongly suggests that victim restitution is comparable to
compensatory damages, and thus, the section 104(a)(2) exclusion
over another; rather, it recommends that all recoveries that are compensatory in
nature be afforded uniform and consistent analysis under section 104(a)(2),
irrespective of the then-accepted standard.
138. The human capital concept is a controversial topic involving economic,
practical, and moral problems in defining human capital. This Comment will
only address the role it has on federal income tax, and will defer any remaining
issues to other commentators.
139. In effect, accumulation of human capital occurs tax-free. Therefore, to
the extent the award represents a mere restoration of capital, it is not income
under section 61(a). See Raytheon Prod. Corp. v. Comm'r, 144 F.2d 110, 113
(1st Cir. 1944); Rev. Rul. 81-277, 1981-2 C.B. 14, 15.
140. See Morgan, supra note 14, at 887.
141. Paul B. Stephan III, FederalIncome Taxation and Human Capital,70
VA. L. REV. 1357, 1367 (1984).
142. Comm'r v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426, 431 (1955); see Brooks,

supra note 13, at 220.
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should apply. If victim restitution in a criminal proceeding and
damages in a civil proceeding could be recovered in whole and
independently from one another, then perhaps yictim restitution and
damages are really not the same. In fact, victim restitution and
damages would be entirely different principles of recovery if one
award could be received in its entirety, completely unaffected by the
other.
The law, however, does not permit this kind of double recovery.
The rule of offset maintains that "[a]ny amount paid to a victim
under an order of restitution shall be reduced by any amount later
recovered as compensatory damages."' 143 In other words, a victim
can recover only one or the other, not both. If a victim received or
will receive compensatory damages, then a victim restitution order
will be reduced by that amount of damages. This double recovery
preclusion for loss significantly confirms that victim restitution and
compensatory damages are, in fact, parallel remedies. For purposes
of defining the meaning and scope of section 104(a)(2), this rule of
offset essentially identifies victim restitution as being like
compensatory damages, and thus, should also be excludible under
the statute.
B. Policy Considerations
In addition to the above-mentioned substantive reasons
supporting the exclusion from gross income of victim restitution for
personal injuries, the proposition also rests on compelling policy
bases. These policy implications vary from civil procedure concerns
against forum shopping to matters affecting the prosecution's
criminal case in chief and the early justification of the section
104(a)(2) exclusionary provision itself-compassion for the victim.
•1. Forum shopping
Section 104(a)(2) as it currently stands with reference only to
damages, may encourage taxpayers to engage in forum shopping. To
illustrate, under the statute it is clear that a plaintiff may take civil
damages for personal injury tax-free, whereas it is not as obvious
whether a similarly situated victim with comparable personal injuries
would be subject to tax for crime victim restitution. The principal
143. 18 U.S.C. § 36640)(2) (2000).
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basis for the potential separate tax treatment between the
aforementioned plaintiffs is the forum in which the recovery is
sought.
Because the section 104(a)(2) exclusion specifically applies only
to damage recoveries, all other non-damage recoveries such as
restitution might be ineligible for the exclusion and thus subject to
tax. Hence, from a tax-planning standpoint, victims are better off
foregoing restitution in a criminal proceeding and the uncertainty
accompanying its taxation, and instead seeking damages in a civil
suit. By virtue of venue and remedy shopping, a plaintiff can ensure
the proper characterization of the recovery as damages, which are
eligible for section 104(a)(2), by bringing an action in a civil court
instead of a criminal court.
2. Collateral consequences affecting the prosecutor's criminal case
In the abstract, a victim in the midst of a criminal proceeding
who is aware of the tax consequences for a victim restitution
recovery and knows about the offset rule may hurt the prosecutor's
criminal case. First, the rule of offset says that any amounts
recovered in a criminal proceeding will be offset by any future
compensatory damages in civil actions. 144 If the victim plans to
pursue a civil action in addition to being part of the state's criminal
case, the victim's attorney in the civil suit would likely advise the
victim of this offset limitation. With that knowledge, if the victim
plans to pursue a civil suit, the victim might proceed through the
criminal case with lackluster testimonies, knowing that whatever
amount of victim restitution is ordered in the criminal case inevitably
will be offset by compensatory damages later recovered in the civil
suit. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the possibility of an acquittal
would deter victims from such a lackadaisical mindset in the criminal
proceeding because evidence of the defendant's acquittal is not
45
admissible in the victim's subsequent civil action for damages.1
Thus, as a taxpayer, regardless of the outcome, the incentives for
pursuing a victim restitution recovery are smaller than the incentives
for pursuing a damages recovery.

144. See id.

145. See STARK & GOLDSTEIN, supranote 66, at 213.
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Second, a plaintiff who is knowledgeable of the possible gross
income exclusion of civil damages and aware of the uncertain tax
consequences of victim restitution might be driven by self-interest to
pursue the civil action more vigorously than the criminal proceeding.
Again, plaintiffs knowledge of the tax consequences of a victim
restitution recovery may have a detrimental effect on the
prosecutor's case. That is, a taxpaying plaintiff would prefer to
concentrate efforts in securing an award of tax-free civil damages,
rather than expending energy on a criminal case that could generate
victim restitution with its unclear tax consequences. Once again, a
potential acquittal in the criminal case may be meaningless to the
victim because such evidence cannot be introduced in the victim's
subsequent civil suit for damages.
Overall, a victim's awareness of the possible tax consequences
together with knowledge of the offset rule might compound to result
in lackluster involvement by the victim in the prosecutor's criminal
case.
The offset rule, regrettably, cannot be eliminated if
compensatory damages and victim restitution are to be treated the
same under section 104(a)(2). If they are both compensation
excludible from gross income under the statute, then the offset rule
must remain as such to properly preclude double recovery.
The litigation tax consequences, however, can and should be
modified to encompass not only damages, but also victim restitution
as falling within the gross income exclusion under section 104(a)(2).
By allowing victim restitution the benefit of the same gross income
exclusion as applied to compensatory damages, then at least one of
the damaging effects on the prosecutor's criminal case will no longer
be a concern. In other words, if victim restitution becomes
excludible from gross income, then there would be no tax advantage
for the victim to pursue compensatory damages more vigorously than
victim restitution.
Victims, then free of tax concerns, would have more incentive to
be interested, and even aid the prosecutor in obtaining a conviction.
While evidence of a defendant's acquittal is not admissible in a
subsequent civil suit, evidence of a defendant's conviction is
admissible. 146 Therefore, providing a section 104(a)(2) exclusion for
victim restitution not only properly provides a gross income
146. See id. at 213-14.
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exclusion for all compensation recoveries, it also removes the tax
disincentive that hinders a victim's proactive involvement in the
prosecutor's criminal case.
Absent a concern for the tax
consequences of victim restitution received in the criminal
proceeding, victims will then be uninhibited in zealously helping the
prosecution obtain a conviction that will later be admissible in a civil
action.
3. Compassion for the victim
More importantly, the plight of the victim cannot be forgotten.
The policy justification for the section 104(a)(2) exclusion,
compassion for the victim, has been an uncontested reason for
excluding compensatory damages from taxable income and should
be equally relevant to victim restitution. It cannot be denied that
personally injured persons who receive victim restitution are not
much different from plaintiffs who receive personal injury damages.
Like the injured person suing for civil damages, victims of violent
crimes who recover restitution in criminal court have suffered
enough and ought not to be burdened with tax obligations.
Unquestionably, the sexual assault victim and battery victim in the
criminal setting does not suffer any less than the plain-vanilla tort
victim injured, for example, by a fall to the ground after having her
chair pulled out from under her. 147 Therefore, on historical policy
grounds, both victims should receive those recoveries tax-free.
Finally, victims of crime are too often plagued by problems
beyond their control that prevent a successful victim restitution
recovery. Seeking victim restitution in the criminal justice system
has two main drawbacks. First and foremost, the defendant must be
148
arrested, charged and convicted before the victim can recover.
Second, asking for victim restitution may be futile unless the
convicted criminal defendant has the means to pay and the restitution
order is enforced. 149 In light of the various arguments previously
raised in this Comment for the excludability of victim restitution, in
the narrow circumstances where victims are able to overcome those

147. See, e.g., Garratt v. Dailey, 304 P.2d 681 (1956) (exemplifying the
similarity between a tort and a criminal victim).
148. See Roland, supra note 113, at 42.
149. See id.
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stumbling blocks and are successful in recovering restitution, the
fruits of such an effort should not be taken away by the Code.
C. Recommendations
The principal materials for the study of tax law-the Code and
the Regulations-must provide uniformity and consistency in the
taxation of recoveries received. Although it is apparent that damages
may be excludible income under section 104(a)(2), nothing in the
Code or Regulations address other recoveries such as victim
restitution. Treasury rulings-both Revenue rulings and letter
rulings-intermittently determine that certain payments to victims
are nontaxable. 150 There is, however, a need for more controlling
authority on point. This Comment recommends that the primary
sources of tax authority, the Code and the Regulations, be amended
to reflect the Treasury rulings and Congress' broad interpretation of
section 104(a)(2) as extending to not only recoveries labeled
damages, but to all personal injury recoveries that are compensatory
in nature.
As mentioned earlier, Treasury rulings concluding the exclusion
of victim compensation from gross income cannot be relied upon as
precedent for the excludability of victim restitution under section
104(a)(2).' 51 These rulings, however, may-be used as persuasive
authority for the proposition that victim restitution should likewise
be excludible under section 104(a)(2) and also for the adoption of a
broader reading of the statute. Although not labeled as damages,
rulings that victim compensation-is nontaxable seem to indicate that
section 104(a)(2) was intended to be construed broadly to encompass
not only damages, but any personal physical injury recoveries which
were compensatory.
Most recently, President George W. Bush signed the September
l1th Victim Compensation Fund of 200152 (the "Fund") after the
September 11 terrorist attacks on New York City and Washington,

150. See Rev. Rul. 74-74, 1974-1 C.B. 18; Priv. Ltr. Rul. 83-52-025 (Sept.
26, 1983).
151. See supra Part II.B.3.
152. September 11th Victim Compensation Fund of 2001; 66 Fed. Reg.
66,274 (Dec. 21, 2001) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 104).
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D.C. 153 The Fund is designed to provide compensation to eligible
individuals who were physically injured as a result of the September
11th attacks. 154 Kenneth R. Feinberg, the Special Master appointed
by the Attorney General to administer the Fund, anticipated that
under Code section 104(a)(2), "all awards from the Fund will be free
of federal taxation."' 155 One of the eligibility requirements for the
Fund is that the individual "suffered physical 156
harm or death as a
result of one of the terrorist-related air crashes.'
Feinberg's anticipation of the tax consequences to recipients of
the Fund seems to suggest that Congress did not intend for section
104(a)(2) to only apply to receipts labeled damages. In a statement
by Feinberg, he reiterated, "compensation will be provided.., for
losses caused on account of personal physical injuries."' 157 Receipts
from the Fund are called compensation and not damages, and yet,
there is anticipation that a non-damages recovery will enjoy section
104(a)(2) treatment.
This is a strong indication that Congress construes the term
damages in section 104(a)(2) broadly, including both damages and
damage-like recoveries. If in the coming taxable years we see
receipts from the Fund being widely recognized within the
applicability of section 104(a)(2), then it may be safe to infer that
Congress has taken the broad view that the statute cannot be taken to
be limited to recoveries literally named as damages. Therefore, to
provide certainty in the application of section 104(a)(2) to all
recoveries that are like damages-i.e., compensatory in nature-the
Code and the Regulations must be revised to reflect more uniform
laws on the taxation of recoveries.

153. On September 11, 2001, four American jetliners were seized by
terrorists. Two of the jetliners were flown into the World Trade Center towers,
the third crashed into the Pentagon, and a fourth plane went down in rural
Pennsylvania. See Serge Schmemann, U.S. Attacked; President Vows to Exact
Punishmentfor 'Evil',N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 12, 2001, at Al.
154. See September 1lth Victim Compensation Fund of 2001, 66 Fed. Reg.
at 66,275.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 66,276.
157. Id. at 66,275 (emphasis added).
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1. Code section 104(a)(2)
The door to a section 104(a)(2) exclusion can be opened by
amending the statutory language of the Code section itself. Section
104(a)(2) currently reads: Gross income does not include "the
amount of any damages (other than punitive damages) received
(whether by suit or agreement and whether as lump sums or as
periodic payments) on account of personal physical injuries or
physical sickness.' 58
The problem lies in the ambiguous reference to damages. One
possible remedy is, following "damages (other than punitive
damages)," Congress may insert the phrase, "compensation, or
compensation-like recoveries." The amended statute would then
read: Gross income does not include the amount of any damages
(other than punitive damages), compensation, or compensation-like
recoveries received (whether by suit or agreement and whether as
lump sums or as periodic payments) on account of personal physical
injuries or physical sickness.
In effect, the statutory exclusion would then apply to any
amounts that are compensatory in nature irrespective of their name.
Because victim restitution is measured by the plaintiff s loss, it is
compensation-like and thus excludible from the recipient's gross
income so long as it is received on account of personal physical
injuries or sickness.
2. Treasury Regulation section 1.104-1(c)
The corresponding Treasury Regulation could also be revised to
allow a section 104(a)(2) exclusion. Regulation section 1.104-1(c)
currently reads:
Section 104(a)(2) excludes from gross income the amount
of any damages received (whether by suit or agreement) on
account of personal injuries or sickness.
The term
'damages received (whether by suit or agreement)' means
an amount received (other than workmen's compensation)
through prosecution of a legal suit or action based upon tort
or tort type rights, or through a settlement
agreement
159
prosecution.
such
of
lieu
in
into
entered
158. I.R.C. § 104(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. 2000).
159. Treas. Reg. § 1.104-1(c) (2002).
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Regulations allow for more explanatory language and thus would be
very effective in giving meaning to damages referred to under the
statute. A sentence may simply be inserted at the end of the existing
language as follows: "The term 'damages' is not exhaustive but
includes any other amounts received which are compensation or
compensation-like, whether received in a civil action or a criminal
proceeding." Under the same reasoning mentioned before, victim
restitution would then be excludible under section 104(a)(2)
according to the Regulation since victim restitution falls within the
compensation-like category.
V.

CONCLUSION

Since crime victim restitution emerged in the VWPA in 1982,
the plight of victims has been heeded. Victims can recover not only
in a civil judgment, but at last they are able to recover compensation
from their offender as part of a criminal sentence. The contour of
victim restitution is best viewed as a "compensatory remedy inserted
60
into the penal framework of the federal criminal justice system."'
Without regard to semantics, victim restitution is compensatory
damages but with an independent basis in criminal punishment.
In light of victim restitution's dual purpose in punishment and
more importantly in compensation, a moment must be taken to
reassess section 104(a)(2) and its isolated reference to damages.
Recognizing that the statute was created with recoveries of
compensation in mind, lawmakers must give effect to the fact that
not only personal injury compensatory damages, but also personal
injury victim restitution, is compensation.
It would appear
inequitable for section 104(a)(2) to apply to compensatory damages
but not to victim restitution when the underlying nature of both
recoveries is to compensate victims for loss.
In sum, there is a need for definitional precision in the Code.
For equitable reasons, the Code must once and for all address victim
restitution and give meaning to the term damages in section 104. I
propose that Congress amend section 104(a)(2) to expressly include
compensation and compensation-like recoveries such as victim
restitution under its statutory exclusion from gross income. In the
160. Von Roeder, supra note 98, at 683 (examining the legislative history of
the VWPA which supports this conclusion).
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alternative, the IRS could prescribe a Treasury Regulation carving
out a definition of damages under section 104(a)(2) to include victim
restitution. Either method would equally serve to broaden the scope
of section 104(a)(2) and allow crime victims the benefit of the
statutory exclusion such that they would receive recoveries of victim
restitution on account of personal physical injuries tax-free. To
allow section 104 to remain in its current and unaltered form is
basically acquiescing to an unjust penalty on the victim via tax
imposition.
Linda Trang*
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